Ransom hackers encrypt medical centre's entire database

An Australian medical centre is reported to be considering paying a ransom demand of $4,000 AUD (US$4215) after blackmailers broke into the organisation’s servers and encrypted its entire patient database.

 If crime doesn't pay, why is this clinic considering making it profitable? Paying ransom only perpetuates the problem. Instead they should be spending the money on securing their systems. The clinic should be asking themselves:

1. Why should I make this crime profitable for the attacker? 
2. How do I know they will provide the password and instructions for decrypting the data? 
3. How do I know that if I decrypt the database, the data hasn't been tampered with? 
4.  If I pay the ransom, what is to stop them from increasing the demand lest they publish the data online?
5. What is a better plan for securing the systems and moving on? 

They already lost once. If they don't bite the bullet and move on, they risk losing again and again. They would also be giving the attackers valuable incentives for attacking more sites.

Lack of a Backup Could Free a Killer

In a criminal case in Miami in 2009, a man named Randy Chaviano was convicted of second-degree murder committed in 2005 and sentenced to life in prison. As usual, a court stenographer was taking notes at the trial. But then there was a string of coincidences worthy of a Law & Order script.

• The stenographer didn’t have enough paper for her machine — a mistake she’d apparently made before
• Consequently, the notes she took were recorded only in the machine’s internal memory
• She transferred the stenography machine’s records to her own PC
• She deleted the records from the stenography machine
• She didn’t do a backup of the PC
• A virus hit the PC and deleted what was by then the only record of the trial, leaving only a pretrial hearing and closing arguments; it wasn’t clear when this happened

Rock Solid: Will Digital Forensics Crack SSD’s?

Journalists always formulate their headlines by stating predictions they know will happen, or asking questions that they know are unlikely to happen. Whenever a headline asks a question, they are really saying 'No'

This article goes into detail about why it is nearly impossible to derive usable forensic data from an SSD drive or memory chip.

Richard Branson lost his memoirs in blaze

Airline tycoon Richard Branson lost his autobiography and 15 years worth of handwritten notes when a fire ripped through his retreat in the British Virgin Islands.

This is a good time to remind everyone that your backups should be stored somewhere well away from the systems they are taken from. Otherwise they can both go up in smoke.

The Navy Bought Fake Trojanized Chinese Microchips

The Navy Bought Fake Trojanized Chinese Microchips.  They weren't only low-quality fakes, they had been made with a "back-door" and could have been remotely shut down at any time. If left undiscovered the result could have rendered useless U.S. missiles and killed the signal from aircraft that tells everyone whether it's friend or foe.

The problem remains with these "trojan-horse" circuits that can be built into the chip and are almost impossible to detect -- especially without the original plans to compare them to.

The Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Agency (IARPA) is now looking for ways to check the chips to make sure they haven't been hacked in the production process.

God Hates Lousy Hackers

As much as I hate PDF files, this one is worth your time.

Westboro Baptist Church has openly challenged notorious Anonymous hackers to BRING IT! In their famous rambling style, the church sees any attack from Anonymous on their websites as a way to promote Westboro's message in the media.

Doesn't publicly requesting a group of hackers to hack your web sites instantly make it legal for them to do so?

First Worm To Deliberately Attack SCADA Systems Found

In June, Belarus antivirus company VirusBlokAda reported a new bug with some interesting features. The Stuxnet worm they discovered was programmed to specifically attack industrial control systems, and reprogram the controllers to hide the changes from view using a methods almost identical to those used in 1980's - 90's stealth viruses.

The last time someone hacked up a SCADA system like this, it caused a 3 kiloton explosion that was reported as having been the most monumental non-nuclear explosion and fire ever seen from space.

Data Destruction

How many times should a hard drive be overwritten before one can safely assume its data is no longer retrievable?

A lot of shady software vendors tell you that you should overwrite repeatedly with various patterns, such as the 35-pass method created by Peter Gutmann more than 30 years ago. Some of these packages are free, most of them cost some arbitrary amount of money. All of them are a waste of money.

Even Mr. Gutmann stated that any hard drives that came out after the early 90's MFM and RLL drives can simply be overwritten once with random data. Sticking a decommissioned hard drive into any unix-like box, or booting the system with a live-CD version of Linux, and simply overwriting it with "dd if=/dev/urandom of=/dev/" will do the trick, and it won't cost you anything.